Résumé : Nous introduisons une extension aux points fixes de la logique IF (faite pour l'indépendance) de Hintikka et Sandu. Nous donnons des résultats sur sa complexité et son pouvoir expressif. Nous la relions aux jeux de paritéà information imparfaite, et nous montrons une applicationà la définition d'un mu-calcul modal fait pour l'indépendance. Abstract: We introduce a fixpoint extension of Hintikka and Sandu's IF (independence-friendly) logic. We obtain some results on its complexity and expressive power. We relate it to parity games of imperfect information, and show its application to defining independence-friendly modal mu-calculi.
Introduction
The topic of this issue, independence-friendly logic, is a logic introduced by Sandu and Hintikka [Sandu 1993 , Hintikka & Sandu 1996 which gives an alternative account of branching quantifiers (Henkin quantifiers) in terms of games of imperfect information. It allows the expression of quantifiers where the choice must be independent of specified earlier choices; it has existential second-order power. As well as its interest for philosophical and mathematical logicians, it also has some natural resonances with the theory of concurrency in computer science. Specifically, in earlier work, we have argued that the modal analogues of IF logic have a role to play in concurrency theory, partly inspired by previous work by Alur, Henzinger and Kupferman [Alur et al. 1997] , in which a temporal logic using imperfect information is studied. (See [Bradfield 2000] and [Bradfield & Fröschle 2002] for discussions of this role and its relation to other work in concurrency theory.)
Given a first-order logic, or a logic like IF that is supposed to look first-order (even though it isn't), it is natural for modal logicians of a certain bent to want to add fixpoint operators. One motivation is just the mathematical interest of studying inductive definability in many contexts; a more computer-science-based motivation is the desire to be able to produce an IF analogue of Kozen's [Kozen 1983 ] modal mu-calculus, a popular and interesting temporal logic -see [Bradfield & Stirling 2001] for an introductory survey of modal mu-calculus.
In [Bradfield 2000 ], we asserted that using the semantics given to IF by Hodges [Hodges 1997] , it was possible to define an IF fixpoint logic. In this article, we give a detailed definition of IF least fixpoint logic (which, typically of IF logics, is a little more subtle than one first thinks), and then study it.
In section 2, we deal with the preliminaries, the existing syntax and semantics of IF logic. Sections 3, 4 and 5 are the main part of the paper; in section 3 we give the detailed definitions of IF fixpoint logic and its semantics; in section 4 we give a couple of interesting examples; and in section 5 we establish some partial results on complexity and expressive power. Then in section 6 we return to the game-theoretic roots of IF by giving a suitable notion of parity game of imperfect information, which gives an alternative semantics for IF fixpoint logic. Finally, in section 7 we briefly sketch the application to IF modal mu-calculus that was one of the original motivations for looking at IF with fixpoints.
This article is a revised version of [Bradfield 2003 ], presented at Computer Science Logic 2003 in Vienna. I thank the referee for some helpful suggestions.
IF-FOL syntax and semantics
First of all, we state one important notational convention: we take the scope of all quantifiers and fixpoint operators to extend as far to the right as possible.
For the purposes of this article, we will use only a sublanguage of IF-FOL (sometimes just IF for short). The full languages advocated by Hintikka and analysed by Hodges and others include the possibility of conjunctions and disjunctions that are independent of previous quantifiers. These operators do not introduce inherently new problems, but they do introduce some additional complexity (and space) in defining the semantics. We will therefore ignore them, and consider only the independent quantifiers; the interested reader can use [Hodges 1997 ] to put back the independent junctions.
One of the more tedious features of IF-FOL is the need to be more pedantic than usual in keeping track of free variables etc., as not all the things one takes for granted in usual logic are true in IF-FOL. When introducing fixpoint operators, even more care is needed, and we shall therefore give the semantics even more pedantically than Hodges did. Definition 1. Assume the usual FOL set of proposition (P, Q etc.) , relation (R, S etc.) , function (f, g etc.) and constant (a, b etc.) In the independent quantifiers the intention is that the choices of the player are independent of the values of the variables in the set W . In terms of imperfect information, the player does not know the values of the W -variables at the choice point. Hence the Henkin quantifier ∀x ∃y ∀u ∃v can be written as ∀x/∅. ∃y/∅. ∀u/{x, y}. ∃v/{x, y}. If one then plays the usual model-checking game with this additional condition, which can be formalized by requiring strategies to be uniform in the 'unknown' variables, one gets a game semantics which characterizes the Skolem function semantics in the sense that Eloise has a winning strategy iff the formula is true. However, these games are not determined, so it is not true that Abelard has a winning strategy iff the formula is untrue. For example, ∀x ∃y .x = y (or ∀x. ∃y/{x}. x = y) is untrue in any structure with more than one element, but Abelard has no winning strategy.
The The interpretation [[φ] ] of a formula is a pair (T, C) where T is the set of trumps, and C is the set of cotrumps.
• If (R( t )) [ x] 
• D is a trump for (∃y/W. ψ) [ x] iff there is a trump E for ψ [ x, y] such that for every
• D is a trump for ∼φ iff D is a cotrump for φ; D is a cotrump for ∼φ iff it is a trump for φ.
• D is a trump (cotrump) for ↓ φ iff D is a non-empty set of members (non-members) of trumps of φ.
A sentence is true in the usual sense if { } ∈ T (the empty deal is a trump set), and false in the usual sense if { } ∈ C; this corresponds to Eloise or Abelard having a uniform winning strategy. Otherwise, it is undetermined.
Note that the game negation ∼ provides the usual de Morgan dualities.
A trump for φ is essentially a set of winning positions for the modelchecking game for φ, for a given uniform strategy, that is, a strategy where choices are uniform in the 'hidden' variables. The most intricate part of the above definition is the clause for ∃y/W. ψ: it says that a trump for ∃y/W. ψ is got by adding a witness for y, uniform in the W -variables, to trumps for ψ.
It is easy to see that any subset of a trump is a trump. In the case of an ordinary first-order φ( x), the set of trumps of φ is just the power set of the set of tuples satisfying φ. To see how a more complex set of trumps emerges, consider the following formula, which has x free: ∃y/{x}. x = y. Any singleton set of deals is a trump, but no other set of deals is a trump. Thus we obtain that ∀x. ∃y/{x}. x = y has no trumps (unless the domain has only one element).
The following definition is for later convenience: a set T of sets of deals is well-dealt if for every D ∈ T , D is non-empty and D ∈ T for every non-empty D ⊆ D. A formula has well-dealt semantics (T, C) if T and C are well-dealt; the above semantics ensures that all IF-FOL formulae have well-dealt semantics.
[Hodges 1997] shows that every well-dealt set is the semantics of some IF formula (given suitable atomic relations), giving us Proposition 4. On a structure A with n elements, IF formulae of length m require space exponential in n m to represent their semantics.
Proof.
The set of tuples for m free variables has n m elements; Given a k element set, there are 2 k subsets, but not all sets of subsets are well-dealt; however, there are about 2 k / √ k sets of size k/2, and hence at least 2 
Proof. A crude analysis of the cost of computing the trump semantics more or less directly from the definitions. Note that the computation for ∃ has further exponential factors above the 2 k from the number of possible trumps, effectively due to the computation of choice functions.
In the case of IF, these exponential upper bounds are much worse than is really required for determining whether a deal satisfies (i.e. is a singleton trump for) an IF formula, since IF expressible properties are in NP (because we can guess values for choice functions).
Adding fixpoint operators.
The prime motivation for considering fixpoint extensions is in the modal setting, where it is a standard way to produce temporal logics from modal logics. However, fixpoint extensions to IF logics raise a number of issues, and it is useful to recall briefly the first-order case.
In the classical settings, fixpoint operators are added to allow sets or relations to be inductively defined by formulae: µ(x, X).φ(x, X), where X is a set variable, is the least set A such that A = { x | φ(x, A) }, and the syntax of formulae is extended to allow terms of the form t ∈ X or t ∈ µ(x, X).φ(x, X) (among set theorists) or X(t) and (µ(x, X).φ(x, X))(t) (among finite model theorists).
In applying this directly to IF-FOL, there is the obvious problem that we no longer have a simple notion of an element satisfying a formula, so the usual definition no longer type-checks. There are two possible approaches, depending on how one views the use of fixpoint terms. If one takes the view that their purpose is to define sets, and the logic is a means to this end, then it is natural to retain the use of set variables, and work out how to make φ(x, X) reduce to a boolean. On the other hand, if one views fixpoint operators as a means of introducing recursion into the logical formulae, it is more natural to decide that fixpoint terms should have the same semantics as other formulae, namely sets of trumps, and that therefore the variables X range over trump sets rather than sets. We then have to decide the meaning of X(t). This is the approach we suggested in [Bradfield 2000 ], and will now pursue.
Definition 6. IF-LFP extends the syntax of IF-FOL as follows:
• There is a set Var = {X, Y, . .
.} of fixpoint variables. Each variable
X has an arity (ar 1 (X), ar 2 (X)); ar 1 (X) is the arity of the fixpoint, and ar 2 (X) is the number of free parameters of the fixpoint.
• If X is a fixpoint variable, and t an ar 1 (X)-vector of terms then X( t ) is a formula.
• The notation φ(X) indicates that X is among the free fixpoint variables of φ. If φ(X) [ x, z] is a formula with ar 1 (X) free individual variables x and ar 2 (X) free individual variables z, and t is a sequence of ar 1 (X) terms with free variables y,
• Similarly for ν (X, x) .φ.
The process of extending the trump semantics to fixpoint formulae is not entirely straightforward. First we define valuations for free fixpoint variables.
Definition 7. A fixpoint valuation V maps each fixpoint variable
Let D be a non-empty set of deals for X( t ) [ x, z, y] , where y are the free variables of t not already among x, z. where a, c, b are the deals for x, z, y respectively, determines a deal
Then we define a suitable complete partial order on denotations:
Lemma 9. If φ(X)[ x, z] is an IF-FOL
+ formula and V is a fixpoint valuation, the map on (℘(℘(A ar1(X)+ar2(X) )) 2 given by
is monotone with respect to ; hence it has least and greatest fixpoints, with ordinal approximants defined in the usual way.
Definition 10. [[µ(X, x).φ(X)[ x, z]]] is the least fixpoint of the map just defined; [[ν(X, x).φ(x)[ x, z]]] is the greatest fixpoint. µ ζ (X, x).φ means the ζth approximant of µ(X, x), defined by
we may also write X ζ or φ ζ when convenient.
The following lemma records the usual basic properties (which have to be checked again in this setting), and one new basic property, particular to the IF case.
Lemma 11. 
The trump and cotrump components of
[[µ(X, x).φ]] are well-dealt. 2. If Y is free in φ, then [[µ(X, x).φ]]
µ and ν are dual: T is a trump for µ(X, x).φ(X) iff it is a cotrump for ν(X, x).∼φ(∼X) (with the outer negation pushed in by duality).
Proof.
(1) by induction on approximants; (2) as usual; (3) from definitions.
A distinctive feature of the definition, compared to the normal LFP definition, is the way that free variables are explicitly mentioned. Normally, one can fix values for the free variables, and then compute the fixpoint, but because of independent quantification this is not possible in the IF setting. For example, consider the formula fragment
The independent choice of y means that the trumps for the fixpoint depend on the possible deals for z, not just a single deal.
Another point is that the trump set of a least fixpoint is the union of the trump sets of its approximants; but the interpretation of logical disjunction is not union of trump sets, but union of trumps (applied pointwise to the trump sets). Thus the usual view of a least fixpoint as a transfinite disjunction is not valid in general. The following explains why, despite this, the IF-LFP semantics is consistent with classical LFP semantics.
Proposition 12. Call a set T of trumps or cotrumps full iff it is the set of non-empty subsets of T . Call a formula φ of IF-LFP classical iff it is in IF-FOL
+ and it contains no independent quantification (i.e. all quantifiers are ∃x/∅ and ∀x/∅). Then 
Examples of IF-LFP
IF logic is not entirely easy to understand and mu-calculi are also traditionally hard to understand, so we now consider some examples that demonstrate interesting features of the combination. For convenience, we introduce the abbrevation φ ⇒ ψ for ψ ∨ ∼φ provided that φ is atomic.
Let G = (V, E) be a directed graph. The usual LFP formula
asserts that the vertex z is reachable from y. Hence the formula
∀y. ∀z. R(y, z)
asserts that G is strongly connected. Now consider the IF-LFP formula
At first sight, one might think this asserts not only that every z is reachable from every y, but that the path taken is independent of the choice of y and z. This is true exactly if G has a directed Hamiltonian cycle, a much harder property than being strongly connected. Of course, the formula does not mean this, because the variable w is fresh each time the fixpoint is unfolded. In the trump semantics, the denotation of the fixpoint will include all the possible choice functions at each step, and hence all possible combinations of choice functions. Thus the formula reduces to strong connectivity.
It may be useful to look at the approximants of this formula in a little more detail, to get some intuitions about the trump semantics. Considering just
we see that in computing each approximant, the calculation of [[∃w/{y, z}. . . . ] ] involves generating a trump for every possible value of a choice function f : x → w. This is a feature of the original trump semantics, and can be understood by viewing it as a second-order semantics: just as the compositional Tarskian semantics of ∃x. φ(x) involves computing all the witnesses for φ(x), so computing the trumps of ∃x/{y}. φ involves computing all the Skolem functions; and unlike the first-order case, it is necessary to work with functions (as IF can express existential second-order logic). Consequently, the nth approximant includes all states such that x → f 1 (x) → f 2 f 1 (x) → . . . → f n . . . f 1 (x) = z for any sequence of successor-choosing functions f i . Thus we see that the cumulative effect is the same as for a normal ∃w, and the independent choice has indeed not bought us anything. It is, however, possible 2 to produce a slightly more involved formula expressing the Hamiltonian cycle property in this inductively defined way, by using the standard trick for expressing functions in Henkin quantifier logics. We replace the formula H by
This works because the actual function f selecting a successor for every node is made outside the fixpoint by ∀s. ∃t/{y, z}. E(s, t) ∧ . . .; then inside the fixpoint, a new choice function g is made so that X (g(x) ), and g is constrained to be the same as f by the clause (s = u ⇒ t = v). (The reader who is not familiar with the IF/Henkin to existential second-order translation might wish to ponder why ∀s. ∃t/{y, z}. E(s, t)∧ µ(X, x).x = z ∨ (x = s ⇒ X(t)) does not work.) 
Complexity and expressive power of IF-LFP
Observe, however, that the contribution from fixpoint alternation is small compared to the cost of computing independent existential quantifiers.
Despite the relative weakness of adding fixpoints, they do in some sense release the power of independent quantification. This is shown by the following theorem.
Theorem 14. There is an IF-LFP sentence (with one least fixpoint) which is EXPTIME-hard to evaluate.
Proof. We give a reduction from the EXPTIME-complete problem of determining whether Player 1 has a winning strategy for the game of generalized chess.
A structure for a generalized chess game between 1 and 2 of order n comprises a board R with n 2 (or any other fixed polynomial) squares r and a set P of n (or any other fixed polynomial) pieces p. A position of the game is a function π : P → R. There may be some relations on P and R in the signature. The game is defined by three first-order formulae with parameter π: a formula φ I (π) true only of the initial position, a formula φ W (π) which is true if player 1 has won at π, and a formula φ M (π, i, p, r) which is true if moving piece p to square r is a legal move for player i from position π. (Without loss of generality, we assume that a move consists of moving exactly one piece. We also assume that φ W includes those positions where player 2 is due to move but cannot.)
Given a position π and a move p, r, the 'next position' formula N (π, p, r, π ) is defined to be ∀p
that π is the position resulting from the move.
The set X of winning positions (i.e. from which 1 can force a win) for 1 can then be inductively defined by the type 3 functional
We now show how to express this inductive definition in IF-LFP. Part of the coding is the well-known [Walkoe 1970 , Enderton 1970 ] expression of existential second-order logic in IF or Henkin logic, which we have already seen in the Hamiltonian cycle example. The general technique is thus: assume given an ESO formula ∃f. ψ. Let Q 1 (f (τ 1 )) , . . . , Q n (f (τ n )) be the instances in ψ of applications of f occurring in atoms Q i . Then the translation is The above argument was applied to the case of finite structures, but there is nothing in it that depends on finiteness. We can therefore obtain the following theorem, which refutes our conjecture in [Bradfield 2000 It remains to investigate lower bounds on the complexity of multiple IF fixpoints. We remark only that the absence of classical negation makes this less easy than it otherwise would be.
IF parity games
We briefly recall the game semantics of first-order logic and of IF logic.
Given a FO formula ψ (in positive form) and a structure A, a position is a subformula φ( x) of ψ together with a deal for φ, that is, an assignment of values v to its free variables x. At a position (∀x. φ 1 , v) , Abelard chooses a value v for x, and play moves to the position (φ 1 , v ·v); similarly Eloise moves at ∃x. φ. At (φ 1 ∧ φ 2 , v), Abelard chooses a conjunct φ i , and play moves to (φ i ( x ), v ), where x , v are x, v restricted to the free variables of φ i ; and at (φ 1 ∨ φ 2 , v), Eloise similarly chooses a disjunct. A play of the game terminates at (negated) atoms (P ( x), v) (resp. (¬P ( x), v) ), and is won by Eloise (resp. Abelard) iff P ( v) is true. Then it is standard that M φ exactly if Eloise has a winning strategy in this game, where a strategy is a function from sequences of legal positions to moves.
These games have perfect information; both players know everything that has happened, and in particular when one player makes a choice, they know the other player's previous choices. Game semantics for IF logic [Hintikka & Sandu 1996 ] use games of imperfect information: at the position ∃x/W. φ, when Eloise chooses a value v for x, she does not know what Abelard chose for the values of the independent variables W . A uniform Eloise strategy for the game is one in which her choice of v is indeed uniform in the values of W , and we say a formula is true if Eloise has a uniform winning strategy. Now recall that in a parity game the positions are assigned ranks 0, . . . , r, and if a run of the game is infinite, Eloise wins if the highest rank appearing infinitely often is even. The model-checking game for FOL extends to a model-checking game for LFP by assigning even ranks to maximal fixpoints and odd to minimal, such that the rank of an inner fixpoint is less than the rank of its enclosing fixpoints. Then the formula is true iff Eloise has a winning strategy for the defined parity game.
Combining these two concepts, a general parity game of imperfect information is given by a usual parity game together with imperfect information requirements at each position, requiring a player to move uniformly in some part of the game history. The winning runs are those given by the usual parity winning conditions; a player wins the game if she has winning strategy for the parity game that is uniform as required by the imperfect information requirements.
In general, infinite imperfect information games are undecidable even on finite structures, since they require players to keep arbitrary knowledge (and lack of knowledge) of the history of the game. To obtain a class of decidable imperfect parity games, we will first give a parity game semantics for IF-LFP, and then define a class of imperfect parity games characterized by IF-LFP. (φ, uv) , where v is the value of t; at a position (X(t), uv w), where u is the deal for the free variables of X, v for x, and w for the variables bound inside φ, play moves to (φ, uv ) 
Definition 17. The model-checking game for an IF-LFP formula is defined by adding the following clauses to the Hintikka-Sandu game for IF. The moves are extended by the usual fixpoint unfolding rule: at a position ((µ(X, x).φ)(t), u), play moves to

Proof.
The argument relating parity conditions to alternating fixpoints relates any set of monotone operators with fixpoints added, to a parity game where moves correspond to operator application; not just in the case of FOL or modal logic. If there is a trump for φ, and u is in the trump, then the trump gives Eloise a strategy to follow from (φ, u) up to the next fixpoint unfolding, and so on, ad infinitum for a greatest fixpoint, or ad finem for a least fixpoint, according to the approximant semantics -and this strategy is history-free, as it depends only on the trump and the formula. Conversely, if Eloise has a uniform winning strategy for (φ, u) , then the strategy choices in the initial portion of the game tree up to the first fixpoint unfolding on each branch define trumps. The details are as usual.
This game account of the IF-LFP semantics brings out the key factor, which may have been less obvious in the trump semantics, that keeps model-checking decidable. This is that passing through a fixpoint variable throws away all information about choices made within the body of the fixpoint, unless they are explicitly passed as parameters. Of course, this is also true in usual LFP, but in the IF case knowledge of previous choices is explicitly part of the semantics. Proof. The finite memory is modelled by parameters of fixpoints. We will use fixpoints X which carry one parameter p for the position in the game, and parameters m i for the memory 'cells'. The inner loop of an inductive definition of winning positions is the usual expression of 'it is Eloise's move and there exists a move such that the next position is in X, or it is Abelard's move and all next moves are in X', as in the formula we used earlier for generalized chess. The quantifiers are made explicitly independent of the memory items required to be unknown (which may require a case analysis of the moves of the game).
To deal with the parities, we use the first-order version of the usual 'parity game formula' from parity automata and modal mu-calculus (see [Bradfield 1999 ] for a detailed explanation of the parity game formula): for each rank j = 0, . . . , r, there is a fixpoint variable X j . Then the inner loop is enclosed by νX 0 .µX 1 . . . . µ/ν.X r ., and the formula X(p, m), where p and m are the position and memory after the next move, is conjoined with
where R j is the formula expressing that the next position has rank j.
The usual proof now applies to give the result. IFML extends the syntax of usual modal logic as follows. Instead of the simple 'next step' modality a Φ, each modality carries a tag α, and may be declared to be independent of previous tags β by the Hintikka slash, giving a syntax a α/β Φ. The intended interpretation is that the choice of a action must be independent of the action chosen in the modality tagged by β; for this to make sense, the action at β should be concurrent (in the technical sense of event structures etc.) with the action at α. The structures for this logic are not simple transition systems, but transition systems with concurrency 3 , in which there is a concurrency relation C between transitions, satisfying certain axioms so that concurrent actions are not causally dependent on one another: in particular, if a and b are concurrent, and ab is a possible sequence, then so must ba be. The semantics of IFML is then given in terms of runs (sequences of states) of the system, directly via an imperfect information modelchecking game. We say that a run satisfies a α/β Φ if Eloise can choose an a transition and move to a position satisfying Φ, and can do so 'uniformly' in the previous transitions labelled by β. Here 'uniformly' means that the choice of a transition is good also for all other runs in which the β-labelled transitions b i are substituted by concurrent transitions b i . The following remarks explain the concurrency-theoretic motivation for defining IF-LFP. The theorems formalizing these remarks will be presented in a more concurrency-theoretic forum. [Bradfield & Frösch-le 2002] 
Remark 23. The game semantics of IFML given in
Conclusion
We have defined a suitable fixpoint extension of independence-friendly logic, and established some results. We have related it to parity games of imperfect information, and we have shown how it may be applied to the construction of independence-friendly modal mu-calculi.
For IF-LFP itself, there are still many questions remaining. Chief among these are better upper and lower bounds on the complexity of model-checking (in the finite case) and descriptive complexity (in the infinite case). We have shown that IF-LFP is more complex than we surmised in earlier work, and it is not unlikely that it will turn out to be much more complex. For the finite case, a forthcoming article with Stephan Kreutzer will contain several results, including that modelchecking is at least EXPSPACE-hard.
Once these are resolved, the question also arises, as remarked by the referee, of the complexity of IF modal mu-calculus. IFML itself is already Σ 1 1 ; we expect IF modal mu-calculus to have complexity similar to that of IF-LFP. Clearly it also has the usual expressive power of temporal logics over modal logics, in that it can describe infinite behaviours; but how this combines with the Henkin quantification is unclear.
